The agreement between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 was inevitable?

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Yes, because... International level: Balance of Power

 

No, because...

The balance of power can be simply defined in modern terms as: a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states.[1] However there is no single definition that is agreed upon today.[2] There was an even broader use of the term in the nineteenth century, balance could mean equilibrium and exist within a hegemonic system.[3] The Foreign Office definition of the time was:

Eyre Crowe
“The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of and equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power.”[4]
In looking at the balance of power international relations scholars tend to look at economics and defence spending.[5] Paul Kennedy for example argues the triumph of a state is a product “of the way in which that state’s economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict.”[6]

In terms of economics Germany was becoming the top European nation its Iron and Steel production in 1907 was 11.6 million tons compared to 12 million tons for Russia, Britain and France combined.[7] Her immense economy allowed Germany to spend very large amounts on the military without straining the economy. She had an immense lead in newer industries for example chemicals and electricals. Economiclly Britain was in decline although still ahead in older industries such as coal production and shipping[8] and even if not on top industrially Britain was still the greatest financial Power. However if one looks at industrial growth Russia was doing best growing at a rate of 5% per year from 1860-1913, and she was the worlds second largest oil producer.[9] However all the statistics did not really matter in 1907. It was the perceptions of power that would be used by statesmen.[10] Thus it was the British fear of possible German hegemony that mattered:

Eyre Crowe
“Germany is defiantly aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England”[11]
Germany was generally perceived as being the primary threat to the system being the most aggressive power and having the greatest military capabilities. From a balance of power perspective it makes sense that an Anglo-Russian Rapprochement occurred when it did. France and Russia together had been enough to balance Germany however Russia’s collapse in 1905 meant that Britain’s weight had to be brought in to maintain the balance.[12]
  1. ^ Robert H. Jackson, ‘The evolution of International Society’, in John Baylis & Steve Smith eds. The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp35-50, p.36.
  2. ^ Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, Routledge, London, 1996, pp.1-4.
  3. ^ Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’, The American Historical Review, Vol.97, No.3, (Jun., 1992), pp.683-706, p.695.
  4. ^ Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907, G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. III The Testing of the entente 1904-6, London, 1928, p.403.
  5. ^ for figures see: Paul Kennedy, ‘The First World War and the International Power System’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Summer, 1984), pp.7-40, A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. pp.xix-xxxvi., ‘National Material Capabilities’ (v3.02), Correlates of War project, www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 26/11/06 (website said to reference article) – Singer J. David, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985’, International Interactions, Vol 14, (1987), pp.115-132.
  6. ^ Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.xv.
  7. ^ Correlates of War
  8. ^ Kennedy, World War, pp.18, 21.
  9. ^ Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp.296, 300.
  10. ^ William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3, (Apr., 1987), pp.353-381, p.353.
  11. ^ Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907. Gooch, BD III, p.417.
  12. ^ Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), pp.42-76, pp.53-54.

 

However structural theory cannot explain other very real alternatives: a continental league or British alignment with Germany. Moreover a balance of power does not always occur. It would have been possible for Britain to pass the buck over the threat of Germany. Germany was mostly a threat to France and Russia as her defence spending was concentrated on the army despite a rapidly growing navy. Britain could therefore afford to stay out of the balance until a conflict occured or Germany appeared to potentially become hegemonic.