Hinde in her brief preface says “the complexities of Canning’s character... make him a particularly fascinating and rewarding subject for a biographical study.”^[1] However Mortorn Ellis Goldstein sees a wide theme to the book of an attempt to show Canning as Pitt’s heir although “a clear delineation of the direct line of policy development by Canning after the master’s death is never adequately enunciated.”^[2] Although this may well be for the most part due to shifting circumstances in the long period after Pitt’s death where Canning spent very little time in office. Hinde does seem to me to be much more looking at Canning’s character and the massive influence this has on his career rather than his policies, she does not give in detail what Pitt’s policies were therefore does not seem to me to be trying to link them. Therefore although Hinde sees Canning as Pitt’s heir it is not necessarily in the sense of policies that this should be found but rather as among the younger members of Pitt’s friends who try to carry his faction forwards after his death. Canning is Pitt’s heir as the natural leader of the Torys, although it takes some time before this occurs in practice.

1. ^ Wendy Hinde, George Canning, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989), p.9.
2. ^ Morton Ellis Goldstein, Review, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.48, No.1, (Mar., 1976), pp.132-135. p.134.

Both the recent biographers have a similar view of Canning and his career, for Dixon “Canning combined ambition, brilliance and wit”^[1] whereas for Hinde “George Canning was outstanding for his intellectual distinction and his brilliance as a parliamentary orator and debater.”^[2] This means that to a certain extent Hinde has trodden a path that has already been walked.

In terms of seeing Canning as being Pitt’s heir Hinde does see Canning’s loyalty to Pitt, and later the faction that came out of Pitt’s friends as being one of the major break’s on Canning’s career. It is Canning’s loyalty, or else his pride, that prevents him taking important posts, and often leaves him out in the cold, effectively without a major cabinet post between his periods as Foreign Secretary from 1809 to 1822. For example Canning joined Pitt in resigning over the issue of Catholic emancipation when as a junior minister he did not have too, and then refused to serve in government without Pitt.

1. ^ Dixion, Peter, Canning, Politician and Statesman, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1976), p.286.
2. ^ Hinde, Canning, p.9.

Despite Wendy Hinde being a Journalist rather than a professional historian her book makes good use of the manuscript sources available, including the Harewood Mss and Stapleton Mss that were newly available at the time of writing. Therefore the biography is mostly based upon primary sources including government documents, parliamentary debates and letters from and by Canning’s contemporaries as well as Canning himself. Despite the wealth of information the book is not bogged down in details is well is thus an easy read.

Even in the last quarter of the book, that is focused on the period when Canning is in his second period as Foreign Minister and then his brief spell as Prime Minister the focus is still on parliamentary and cabinet politics rather then foreign policy. This obviously partially reflects the importance of Parliament to any British politician. Unlike his European contemporaries who worked in Autocratic regimes Canning could not cut himself off from Parliament, Parliament was able to conduct enquiries and motions of censure. As Hinde puts it “Canning was always a dedicated House of Commons man.”^[1] Helping to explain why the focus of the biography always remains on Canning’s roots in domestic politics. This is particularly the case for Canning who takes pride in building and retaining popular support for his foreign policy, thus he made public speeches justifying his positions, as with one in Plymouth in October 1823 arguing his refusal to be drawn into intervention into Spain.19 Similarly Canning as Foreign Minister or even Prime Minister could often not make decisions without the Cabinet even if he had wanted too, the Cabinet attempted to directly influence foreign policy.

1. ^ Hinde, Canning, p.464.

There are however small bits of information that is useful or interesting from the perceptive of someone studying diplomacy. There is a very short section on the organization of the Foreign Office at the time, and Canning’s time as ambassador is informative about some of the difficulties of being in effect a special envoy, finding accommodation, and finding that the reason for his mission disappeared when the Portuguese government decided not to return from Brazil.^[1]

1. ^ Hinde, Canning, pp.269-73.

For most of the book Hinde concentrates on the politics of the House of Commons and Canning’s personal life. This makes the book surprisingly unhelpful and uninteresting from a diplomatic point of view, what there is on international politics is more like an international history than an account of diplomatic practice or the workings of the Foreign Office. There are some periods where despite Canning being at the Foreign Office some areas of international affairs are not well covered. Therefore although Canning first became Foreign Minister from the 25th of March 1807 the fall of Prussia in 1806-1807 is dealt with in less than two pages despite its obvious importance once again leaving Britain to fight on alone.^[1]

1. ^ Hinde, Canning, pp.161-2.

Hinde looks at Britain’s foreign policy from the perspective of British interests and public opinion. Thus “England had struck out on a course of her own, and the dividends, in terms of political prestige, were unmistakable.”^[1] In effect Canning was overturning Castlereagh’s security regime and pursuing realist policies of “pragmatic - even opportunist - calculation of what would best preserve peace and promote England’s prestige and prosperity.” Hinde also argues that this was not necessarily a major turnaround, that Castlereagh would have moved in the same direction had he continued as Foreign Minister.^[2] However it seems to me to be unlikely that Castlereagh would have made such a dramatic abandonment of the very institution he had been instrumental in creating.

1. ^ Hinde, Canning, p.390.
2. ^ Ibid, pp.322-24.

There are divergent views over Canning’s second period as Foreign Minister. Scholars of International History of the period tend to see Canning as pursuing policies that are disruptive to the concert of Europe, a direct turn around from his predecessor Castlereagh’s policies. Schroeder argues, “Where Castlereagh had wanted to draw France along with Britain... Canning wanted to teach France a lesson and prove that Britain was independent of Europe.”^[1] Kissinger writes of the change from Castlereagh to Canning “an isolationist, suspicious Britain, eager to play its traditional role of balancer of the equilibrium, was more likely to encourage divisions on the continent than to ameliorate them.”^[2] For Holbraad Canning “did more than any other man in Europe to put an end to the system” and his period as Foreign Secretary can be seen as the start of British isolationism.^[3] Both Schroeder and Holbraad are more critical as they see Canning’s foreign policy from the perspective of the damage Britain does to the concert system and European stability. The British withdrawal from the concert can even be seen as destroying it, therefore destroying the first international institution designed to prevent war.^[4]

1. ^ Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), p.634.
2. ^ Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, (Victor Gollancz ltd., London, 1973), p.313.
3. ^ Carsten Holbraad, The Concert of Europe, (Longman, London, 1970). pp.126-7.
4. ^ Louise Richardson, ‘The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the Nineteenth Century’, in Keohane, Robert O., et al ed. Imperfect Unions Security Institutions over Time and Space, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). p.56.