The Scots had been outmanoeuvred, left off subcommittees, even the English Presbyterians did not wish the Scots included in English negotiations.^[1] When the Scots sold the King they solved a short-term problem but leaving themselves with a bigger long-term problem of how to make a permanent peace with England. Without the King they no longer had any way of influencing English events without recourse to war. The Scots, taking Argyll’s policy over Hamilton’s, also reduced the size of their army, their last means of influence.^[2]

The Irish were even more peripheral. During this period the Irish were also working for peace, with as an example the ‘Ormond peace’ that was rejected at the general assembly This caused Ormond to turn over his Royalist positions to Parliament; this seriously undermined the Irish position, as the English Parliament was their main enemy. Factionalism prevented the Irish Catholics from consistently aiding Charles win victory in the civil wars meaning that once Parliament was in complete control of England an invasion was only a matter of time.^[3] This attempt itself caused divisions between the New Model Army and Parliament however this was only indirect influence by Ireland on the prospects of an English settlement. The Scots and Irish were therefore peripheral and would effectively have to take whatever settlement resulted. Their main impact was in any English reaction.

1. ^ Lotte Mulligan, ‘Peace negations, Politics and the Committee of both Kingdoms 1644-1646’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 12, No.1, (1969) pp.3-22, p17
2. ^ David Stevenson, Revolution and Counter-revolution in Scotland, 1644-1651, London, 1977, p81-2
3. ^ Jane H. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three stuart Kingdoms, The career of Randal MacDonnell, marquis of Antrim, 1609-1683, Cambridge, 1993, pp.182-184, 193, 199

The Scots had been part of the Committee of both Kingdoms and as such were theoretically supposed to be consulted on any peace proposals.

A settlement should have been relatively easy to bring about. There was no clash, as yet, between irreconcilable ideologies.^[1] The war had been fought over relatively small differences both accepted that it was King and parliament together who held power, the disagreement was over who should give way in the event of conflict, in this case over the Militia bill. For Parliament, if the King was in the hands of evil counsellors sovereign power resided in Parliament, whereas Charles believed this power should remain with the King.^[2]

If parts of the opening proclamations are taken as the war aims of the two sides then they should never have been fighting. In His maiesties proclamation for the suppressing of the present rebellion the King called upon the trained bands:

1. ^ Austin Woolrych, Britain in revolution 1625-1660, Oxford 2002, p340
2. ^ C.V. Wedgwood, The King’s War 1641-1647, London, 2001, p73
3. ^ England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I), His Maiesties proclamation for the suppressing of the present rebellion under the command of Robert Earle of Essex, Oxford, 1642, EEBO, p8-9
4. ^ England and Wales. Parliament. A declaration and resolution of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, London, 1642, EEBO, E.112[6], p6

Both declarations are very similar however Charles and Parliament both had different ideas about what the true protestant religion was, and what the privileges of parliament should be. Both sides also declared that the other were traitors to the King and offered pardon if the opposing side laid down their arms.

The main point raised against the Royalists by the Parliamentarians, as it the case in almost all rebellions, was that “the venom of those Traiterous counsellors about his majesty”^[1] were those at fault. Parliament also blamed this misguided council for the immediate start of the war “Since which time by their perpicious Councells, they have caused his Majestie to ingage himselfe in a Warre against Hull”^[2] However these allegations against counsellors show the true reasons for parliaments fight against the King:

Parliaments aims of preventing an absolutist King and replacing any misguided counsellors are brought about as soon as the King is in their hands. The King on the other hand is presented with a fait accompli; parliament has control of the army and any counsel to the King. At the end of the war it would seem that the King should be willing to accept a peace treaty that is based upon parliaments war aims, after all he has lost nothing since just before the war.

1. ^ England and Wales. Parliament. A declaration and resolution of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, London, 1642, EEBO, E.112[6], p3
2. ^ England and Wales. Parliament. The Parliaments protestation: Or The resolution of the Lords, and Commons, to maintaine the iust priuiledge of Parliament, London, 1642, EEBO, E.109[6], p3
3. ^ England and Wales. Parliament. A declaration and resolution of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, London, 1642, EEBO, E.112[6], p3-4

King Charles however was fighting to regain privileges that he believed parliament had taken from him:

1. ^ England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I), His Majesties declaration to all his loving subjects, occasioned by a false and scandalous imputation laid upon His Majesty of an intention of raising or leavying war against his Parliament, and of having raised force to that end, London, 1642, EEBO, p3
2. ^ ibid, p3

King Charles adopted the theory of mixed monarchy right at the beginning of the civil war, that there needed to be balance in which neither the King nor parliament could create a tyranny.^[1] This balance was brought about through the three estates having independent powers with which to check the others.

1. ^ Corinne Comstock Weston, ‘English Constitutional Doctrines from the Fifteenth Century to the Seventeenth: II. The Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and after’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 296, (Jul. 1960), pp.426-443, p427-428
2. ^ England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I), His Majesties answer to the nineteen propositions of both Houses of Parliament, Cambridge, 1642, EEBO, pp.8, 12
3. ^ Denzil Holles, Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles, Baron of Ifield in Sussex, From the Year 1641, to 1648, London, p200

However this conversion allowed Charles to position himself as champion of a reformed constitution,^[1] allowing the Royalists to accuse parliament of being the side that was acting arbitrarily and authoritarian, bring up the spectre of a puritan tyranny.^[2] It gave him a convincing constitutional reason to reject any settlement that damaged that balance. Essentially it was a political tactic rather than a real change in belief in the monarchy being absolute.

1. ^ Weston, Mixed Monarchy, p429-430
2. ^ J.W. Daly, ‘Could Charles be Trusted? The Royalist Case, 1642-1646’,The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Nov., 1966), pp.23-44, p37-8

Charles himself may have believed that he was divinely ordained; God had given him paramount authority in his Kingdoms and that he would be committing a sin if he gave up any of his sacred authority.^[1] Nonetheless he was prepared to negotiate on some points, he consented on Ireland:

Charles was prepared to negotiate with any opponent so long as the restraints placed upon him would not prevent him being, in his eyes, the King. If Charles’ primary concern about the church was that the King could exercise his authority through the church then a settlement over religion was also possible hence Charles could not accept:

1. ^ C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I, London, 1970, p11
2. ^ Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles the First to the happy restoration of Charles the Second, Vol. II, Oxford, 1853, p421
3. ^ Whitelock, Memorials, p419

Charles however was unwilling to compromise his position on the church his “conscience being irreconcilably engaged against it.”^[1] This put Charles at odds with those who would have been his most obvious constitutional supporters. Although Charles took his position based upon his conscience there were practical reasons as to why he was unwilling to give way on religion. The church was the foundation of the monarchy in several ways:

1. ^ To the Lords Jermyn and Culpeppert, and Mr. John Ashburnham, Newcastle, July 22, 1646, Petrie, Letters, p201
2. ^ To the Prince of Wales, Newcastle August 26, 1646, Petrie, Letters, p205-6
3. ^ To the Lords Jermyn and Culpeppert, and Mr. John Ashburnham, Newcastle, July 22nd, August 19th, 1646, Petrie, Letters, pp.200, 204

The independents position shifted most dramatically during the period in which a settlement between the two sides was possible. Cromwell like the King recognised in 1646 that “Things are not well in Scotland; would that they were in England! We are full of faction and worse.”^[1] Although from the outset the Independents were much more radical in being willing to think of replacing Charles they were equally willing to make a settlement with him at the expense of the Presbyterians. For Ireton the most important thing was a permanent peace, in which:

1. ^ Wilbur Cortez Abbott, The Writings and speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Vol. I 1599-1649, Cambridge, 1937, p410
2. ^ C.H. Firth ed., The Clarke Papers Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Vol. I, Westminster 1891, p197
3. ^ The Heads of the Proposals offered by the Army, Gardiner, Constitutional, p316-323
4. ^ Firth, Clarke Papers, p233
5. ^ Abbott, Cromwell, p564

However the view of the independents changed quickly away from peace with the King. There had been accusations of bloodguilt levelled at King Charles during the first Civil war, for example by minister Christopher Love. The levellers in the Putney debates brought up the idea again, with the idea playing a role in the Army’s decision making, withdrawing support from any further negotiations. In launching the 2nd civil war Charles had gone against God, and God had confirmed his judgement against Charles. Blood guilt prevented any argument about the necessity of compelling Charles to sign a peace. This shifted the argument to how was the Lords wrath to be assuaged, blood guild destroyed the Kings sacredness, preventing Charles from being King and preventing any negotiations.^[1] Cromwell, also in the “Saddle letter”, cited the Kings untrustworthiness as preventing any negotiations after the 2nd Civil war:

1. ^ Patricia Crawford, ‘Charles Stewart, That Man of Blood’, The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Spring, 1977), pp41-61, pp.49, 52-4, 56, 45, 42
2. ^ Abbott, Cromwell, p564

C.V. Wedgwood asserts “In the new situation which had come into being the defeated King was merely a piece in the game to be used or set aside in the struggle between authority (Parliament or Presbytery, Church or Law) and the people.”^[1]

1. ^ Wedgwood, War, p615

Charles however was a genuine player in any negotiations for a settlement; his decisions had a genuine impact on the Independents and Presbyterians vying for power, there was even the potential for a revival of royalist sympathies, particularly if he brought peace. This revival is shown by the risings, in traditionally parliamentary areas, at the outbreak of the 2nd civil war.

Charles believed that as he was king was an organ of the state that could not be replaced, “without my establishing, there can be no peace”.^[1] His opponents would be forced to tone down their demands upon him. To this end he promoted division in his enemies camps:

1. ^ To the Lords Jermyn and Culpeppert, and Mr. John Ashburnham, Newcastle, October 27, 1646, Sir Charles Petrie ed., The Letters and Speeches and Proclamations of King Charles I, London, 1968, p210
2. ^ To the Queen, Newcastle, June 17, 1646. Petrie, Letters, p182
3. ^ To the Lords Jermyn and Culpeppert, and Mr. John Ashburnham, Newcastle, October 27, 1646, Petrie, Letters, p210

Except on religion the demands of the Presbyterians were much more in line with the causes of the civil war, for example:

The Presbyterians were involved in conflict with the independents in both Parliament and the army, making it less likely they would be able to impose a Presbyterian settlement on either the King or the country as a whole. Any attempt to establish Presbyterianism was coming too late as with the breakdown of authority during the war independent churches had sprung up and were supported by the army, in which with ideal conditions independency was flourishing.^[2] In the long run this conflict could lead towards a settlement as the Presbyterians would have to give in or reduce their demands on religion, a major sticking point in any attempt to have a negotiated settlement.

1. ^ Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, p.292
2. ^ Clare Cross, ‘The Church in England 1646-1660’, in G.E. Aylmer ed., The Interregnum The Quest for Settlement 1646-1660, (London, 1979), pp99-120, p102

What the Presbyterians wanted was set out in the Newcastle Propositions; its core was religion:

1. ^ Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., The Propositions of the Houses sent to the King at Newcastle, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660, 3ed ed., Oxford, 1906, p291
2. ^ J.S.A. Adamson, ‘The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, (Sep.,1987), pp.567-602, p584

Charles was however correct that the Presbyterians and independents had divergent interests. In the summer of 1647 many in the Army believed that a settlement was more likely between them and the King than with Parliament. Charles never realised that ultimately he would have to choose between religious concessions to the Presbyterians or constitutional concessions to the independents.^[1] Charles was correct in his assessment of the Presbyterians, as they were unwilling to remove the King they had to move their proposals substantially towards the Kings position.

1. ^ Woolrych, revolution, p359, 375.

Charles was wrong about the Independents. The independents had been willing from an early stage to contemplate replacing Charles with one of his, hopefully more compliant, sons. According to the Venetian Ambassador, Henry Vane was investigating this course as early as June 1644:

1. ^ Allen B. Hinds ed., Calendar of State papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of North Italy, Vol. XXVII 1643-1647, London, 1926, p110
2. ^ Woolrych, Statesmen, p116
3. ^ Firth, Clarke Papers, pxli
4. ^ Adamson, Nobility, p585
5. ^ Robert Baillie, Letters and Journals: Containing an impartial account of public transactions, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, in England and Scotland from the beginning of the civil wars, in 1637, to the year 1662, Vol. II, Edinburgh, 1775, ECCO, p127
6. ^ Adamson, Nobility, p569, 598-600
7. ^ Mr. Edward Sexby, Firth, Clarke Papers, p227-8
8. ^ Woolrych, Revolution, p400