The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be better

The bipolar world of the cold war was stable and relatively peaceful. There was no general war among the great powers of the world, unlike the previous half century. The cold war peace has lasted longer even than that created by the concert of Europe between 1815 and 1856. Bipolarity allowed both sides to keep tight control over their respective blocs as they were by far and away the most powerful members. Balancing had to be internal rather than through the movements of a ‘swing’ state, this was done in part by nuclear weapons stockpiles, once they reached a certain level it did not matter if one side had more, the other could still deter attack.
Deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking. It is achieved by the ability to punish. This is why a second strike capability is necessary. [[John J. Mearshimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrant', Foreign Affairs, (Summer, 1993), pp.57-58, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0020.pdf]] Nuclear weapons make defence and deterrence much more effective than offence. This is because nuclear weapons are a weapon of last resort; they are most likely to be fired in defence. If a country concentrates on its second strike capability rather than offensive nuclear weapons it is possible for it to become an entirely defensive weapon, this would mean it could not act as a coercive threat and would not result in a security dilemma.[[Robert Jervis, ‘Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era’, Foreign Affairs, (July, 2001) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57069/robert-jervis/weapons-without-purpose-nuclear-strategy-in-the-post-cold-war-era]]

The 1999 Kargil conflict demonstrates that nuclear armed states may well engage in wars. Pakistan was not deterred from engaging in a conflict despite the Indian nuclear weapons. Pakistan even while the operations were going on, maintained that in view of asymmetry of conventional forces, they cannot accept a "no first use" policy. Indeed the Indians won the conflict, but were restrained from going further than forcing the Pakistan forces across their border, India not pressing its victory prevented any feeling by Pakistan that they were being backed into a corner, so helping prevent a nuclear conflict. Pakistan believed that a stable nuclear balance between the two states meant they could take more offensive action in Kashmir as India could not retaliate with her conventional superiority. [[Dr. S. Chandrasekharan, (July, 1999) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers/paper71.html]]

It would be wrong to associate the words "stable and relatively peaceful" with Cold War proceedings. In the same way that Operation BARBAROSSA caught the Soviets by suprise in WW2, (in which Hilter began his invasion of Soviet Russia under the mask of a military training exercise) the UN command-post exercise, ABLE ARCHER also caused much scaremongering amongst the USSR in 1983 that could may well have skipped any "deterrance" efforts. Evidence here stands in the case of Stanislav Petrov, who, according to several sources, averted a nuclear war on September 26, 1983, when he deviated from standard Soviet doctrine by positively identifying a missile attack warning as a false alarm. 
Let it be noted that this false alarm may well have been the cause of an "accidental" strike by the Soviets that would definitely be the end of the world as it was known. Through these events, deterrence cannot account for error.  
 
In modern day, the USA and Georgian allies staged exercise Immediate Response 2008 last year on Georgian soil, and again this year, NATO is planning yet another peacekeeping exercise - All despite fierce Russian objection. These tensions are very much real and although in todays world the likelyhood of direct conflict is extremely slim, there is always room for deviation.