The United States gained the attention and sympathy of the world’s public, helping to allow a rapprochement with Russia as the Russian public had experienced comparable terrorist acts. President Putin was "deeply shocked by the reports of the tragic events that occurred today in the United States. The barbaric terrorist attacks against innocent people evoked the anger and indignation of the Russian people,”^[1] he was the first foreign leader to pass on his sympathy and condolences to President Bush. It allowed Putin to show himself and Russia as a friend and ally of the United States by offering support.^[2]

1. ^ Russian President Vladimir Putin telegram of condolence to US President George W. Bush, September 11, 2001, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2001/09/136023.shtml
2. ^ Mark Oksana Antonenko, ‘Putin’s Gamble’, Survival, Vol.43, no.4, (Winter, 2001-02), pp.49-60, p.50

As Sergey Ordzhonikidze declared “The hearts of Russians who know first-hand what terrorism is like are also filled with grief for all those who fell victim to terrorism in other parts of the planet.”^[1]Russia already had experience with terrorism with a string of bombings in the summer of 1999 which the Russian government blamed on the Chechans.^[2] September 11th was a gift to Putin as it transformed perceptions of the situation in Chechnya.^[3] Prior to September 11th the Western media had been skeptical about Chechan militants having been the bombers of the apartment blocks, often publishing conspiracy theories that it was rogue elements of the Russian security services, or even originated from the Kremlin.^[4] September 11th vindicated the Russian position against Islamic fundamentalism. The United States’ fight against islamic extremists brought advantages for Russia, it put the United States in a difficult position if it criticised Russia’s own fight against extremism in Chechnya that had been extremely bloody with 45000 civilians killed and 200000 made refugees.^[5] This campaign was effectively legitimised by September 11th as it was similar to what the United States would fight in Afghanistan.^[6] In effect the door was opened for a bargain whereby America was silent on Russia’s clampdown in Chechnya and the media while Russia allowed US activity in its near abroad. Both thought of themselves as being in a common struggle against terrorism, and were willing to use more traditional security measures to fight the war on terror.^[7]

1. ^ Statement by Sergey A. Ordzhonikidze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, on agenda item 166 of the 56 session of the UN General Assembly: Measures to eliminate international terrorism New York, October 1, 2001
2. ^ Mark Kramer, Guerilla Warfare, Counter Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucuses: The Military Dimension of the Russia-Chechen conflict, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.57, No.2, (March, 2005), pp.209-290, p.212.
3. ^ Claire Bigg, Five Years After 9/11: The Kremlin's War On Terror, Radio Free Europe, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/09/sec-060908-rferl02.htm
4. ^ World: Europe, Russia's bombs: Who is to blame? Thursday, September 30, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/449325.stm
5. ^ Kramer, Guerilla, pp.210, 214.
6. ^ Oksana Antonenko, ‘Putin’s Gamble’, Survival, Vol.43, no.4, (Winter, 2001-02), pp.49-60, p.51
7. ^ Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, ‘America, Russia and Europe: a Realignment?’, Survival, vol.44, no.4, (Winter, 2002-03), pp.121-134, p.125.

International terrorism was suddenly moved to the top of the US’s security agenda, in essence terrorism became securitised, becoming a military and global problem, rather than a localised problem to be dealt with by the police.^[1] This moved the United States into line with Russia’s view on terrorism. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 recognised that closer relations was built on common national interests; “They [Russian policy makers] understand, increasingly, that Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas.”^[2]

1. ^ Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great Power’, in Jakob Hedenskog et al (eds.) Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of Security under Putin, (Routledge, London, 2005), pp.13-28, p.18.
2. ^ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf pp.26-27.

However “Russia’s very weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation”. From the point of view of the United States while Russia while an important partner it was not essential.^[1]

1. ^ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf pp.26-27.

With September 11th Central Asia moved from being an area of peripheral importance to being a central US interest.^[1] The US knew Al Qaeda were responsible for the attacks and needed to respond by depriving the organisation of its base. “And make no mistake about it, the new war is not only against the evildoers, themselves; the new war is against those who harbor them and finance them and feed them.”^[2] The Taliban were both sheltering extremists and exporting disorder to their surrounding states.^[3] September 11th also brought a change in how the United States dealt with the autocratic rulers of the area, bringing policy more into line with Moscow’s interests. The US changed from promoting democracy in the region to trying to keep the region stable by supporting the incumbent regimes. For example Uzbekistan was given US political, military and economic support despite human rights violations.^[4] There were also secondary US interests that were not related to terrorism such as attempting to limit the production of drugs and the corruption this causes. The promotion of “peace and stability to Afghanistan” and the promised aid to “rebuild Afghanistan and the region economically,” were also secondary US interests in the region.^[5] This meant that the US needed Russian support or at least neutrality in the region and would no longer be operating against Russian interests through promotion of democracy.

1. ^ Boris Rumer, The Powers in Central Asia, Survival, vol. 44, no.3, (Autumn, 2002), pp.57-68, pp.63-64.
2. ^ At O'Hare, President Says "Get On Board", Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010927-1.html
3. ^ Rajan Menon, ‘The New Great Game in Central Asia’, Survival, vol.45, no.2, (Summer, 2003), pp.187-204, p.188.
4. ^ Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (I.B. Tauris, London, 2004), p.64.
5. ^ Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Afghanistan, Office of the Press Secretary, November 13, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-9.html

By taking action in Central Asia the US had moved into the area that Russia regards as its near abroad. Central Asian states putting themselves under the patronage of Washington was directly contrary to Russia’s interests.^[1]

1. ^ Boris Rumer, The Powers in Central Asia, Survival, vol. 44, no.3, (Autumn, 2002), pp.57-68, p.61.

By offering the USA help in Central Asia Putin managed to appear to be taking the lead in Central Asia by having “agreed... with our allies from among Central Asian nations” therefore helping to prevent any erosion of Russia’s interests in Central Asia.^[1] It was in Russia’s interests to have the US stabilise Central Asia as instability could affect Russia. Russia was beginning to find that she could not prevent such instability herself.^[2] Moreover Russia could not prevent American intervention in Central Asia therefore it was sensible to make sure it was co-opted to serve Russia’s own interests, namely to be against international terrorism, rather than being directed against Russia herself, by doing so Russia could preserve her influence in the region. As America was willing to take on the costs of maintaining the security of the region Russia could retrench and cut costs.^[3]

1. ^ Statement by President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Moscow, September 24, 2001
2. ^ Mette Skak, ‘The logic of foreign and security policy change in Russia’, in Jakob Hedenskog et al (eds.) Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of Security under Putin, (Routledge, London, 2005), pp.81-106, p.92.
3. ^ Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (I.B. Tauris, London, 2004), pp.172-174

For Russia there were other strategic reasons too support the United States that did not require a shared experience with terrorism, President Putin noted that “Terrorism and drugs are absolutely kindred phenomena.” With Russia’s immense drug problems “We have a conspicuous growth of the share of highly concentrated drugs, and in the first place Afghan heroin”^[1] Therefore supporting intervention in Afganistan would hopefully reduce the amounts of these drugs being transited through Russia.

1. ^ Speech by President Vladimir Putin at a Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Moscow, September 28, 2001